周波：是美国叫嚣要在台湾海峡运用核武器，而不是中国大陆

liukang20241周前 (04-18)吃瓜科普381

编者按：本年7月，我国发布《我国关于互不首要运用核兵器主张的作业文件》，再次呼吁“核兵器国家选用不首要运用核兵器方针，或许宣告互不首要运用核兵器”，推动国际平和进程。

近来，清华大学战略与安全研讨中心研讨员、中央军委国际军事协作办公室安全协作中心前主任周波应帕格沃什科学和国际业务会议（Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs）约请，就“我国与核裁军”进行线上专题讲座，就“不首要运用核兵器”方针的内涵逻辑以及详细的可执行办法进行了论说。

帕格沃什科学和国际业务会议是一个由闻名学者和公共人物的国际组织，旨在削减装备抵触带来的风险，寻求处理全球安全要挟的途径。1955年《罗素—爱因斯坦宣言》发布，1957年，该组织树立，创建人为约瑟夫·罗特布拉特（Joseph Rotblat）和伯特兰·罗素，创建地址为加拿大帕格沃什。罗特布拉特与帕格沃什科学和国际业务会议因在核裁军上的极力而获得了1995年诺贝尔平和奖。

观察者网和北京对话授权翻译、发布讲座全文如下：

【翻译/李泽西核译/韩桦】

周波：谢谢彼得·詹金斯大使。今日能与各位帕格沃什成员沟通我深感侥幸。我要特别感谢我在剑桥大学圣·埃德蒙学院就读期间的院长布莱恩·希普爵士在感染新冠的状况下在线到会。

今日我将议论一些与核兵器和我国有关的议题。首要，咱们是否现已进入了一个新的核年代？让我引证周恩来总理承受法国记者采访时的答复。其时记者问，“怎样看待法国大革命”？听说他的答复是，“现在下结论为时太早”。

那么，咱们是否现已进入了一个新的核年代？答案亦是如此。但假如一些核武国家，比方美国，重新开端核试验——前美国国家安全顾问奥布莱恩等单个美国人鼓动特朗普，假如再次中选，就展开核试验——那么其他国家必定会仿效。到那时，咱们能够必定地说，核试爆的震慑将标志着新的核年代敞开。

让我先来谈谈欧洲迸发核战役的或许性以及我国对此的情绪。

美国中央情报局剖析以为，乌克兰产生核战役的概率为50%。虽然咱们不确定未来会怎样展开，但依据CSIS（美国战略与国际研讨中心）的计算，俄罗斯领导层在议论乌克兰抵触时现已有200次说到运用核兵器。要害问题是，俄罗斯的相关说法有几分仔细？

日前，普京总统命令修改了核方针，基本上是下降了核兵器的运用门槛：只需俄罗斯和白俄罗斯遭受惯例兵器进犯，且这种进犯对主权构成严峻要挟，即可运用核兵器。但何为“严峻要挟”并没有清晰的界说，这就引发了新的问题：什么样的状况才算是严峻要挟？

我个人以为，相对而言，俄罗斯在某些状况下更有或许动用核兵器，比方说，假如他们面对失掉克里米亚的要挟。可是在当时形势下，这种或许性并不大。

另一种状况是俄罗斯失掉现已在宪法上宣告为其疆域的四个（乌克兰）东南部区域，当然各方关于他们是否能够彻底掌控这四个区域，仍存在着不同观念。

我以为最精确的答复是，没人知道战役怎样完毕。我早年与一位乌克兰大使攀谈，她说了一句话让我形象深入。我问她，战役会持续多久？她答复道：“咱们的孙辈们会持续战役。”我不知道这是否会成真，但那是她的原话。

因而，这是第二种或许性。但还有第三种或许性或许最为实践，那便是，当红线看似不再存在时，形势最为风险。我指的是，在美国的支撑下，配备西方装备的乌克兰，正一点点进入俄罗斯境内战役。虽然这是战役初期的红线，但这条红线好像不复存在了。

当地时间2022年2月24日，普京总统宣告，俄罗斯装备部队将展开一项特别军事举动。图为当日克里米亚的俄罗斯军用货车驶近乌克兰边境视觉我国

接下来咱们看看北约扩张的状况。我与许多西方人士沟经过，他们不以为北约扩张是俄罗斯抉择与乌克兰产生抵触的主要原因，但我深信这是其间的要害。实践上，俄罗斯的正告并不始于普京总统，这能够追溯到苏联时期。从戈尔巴乔夫到叶利钦再到普京，俄方领导都曾宣告相似的正告。

那普京与上一任有什么不同呢？我以为他是那个抉择不再忍受的人。乌克兰的终究结局会怎样？现在下结论还为时尚早，但我以为最有或许的结果是相似于朝鲜半岛的休战协议。不过，这种休战协议或许会愈加软弱，由于其间一方是国际上核武储藏最多的五常之一。

我能猜想俄罗斯未来会怎样举动，他们会运用核含糊方针，或许或许在未来几十年宣告愈加严峻的核要挟。为什么会这样呢？原因很简略，由于俄罗斯的惯例兵力较之于暗斗时期现已大幅削弱。1982年他们曾宣告不首要运用核兵器，1993年抛弃了这一许诺，由于苏联崩溃后，俄罗斯的惯例实力已不如早年。

那么，我国的状况怎样呢？首要，我想谈一下我国与俄罗斯的联系，它被称为“无上限同伴联系”，这引起了整个西方国际的忧虑。

但对我来说，这种“无上限同伴联系”仅仅是我国期望与其最大邦邻树立友谊的一种天然描绘办法。试想一下，假如我说我想与你树立友谊，但随即声明，咱们的友谊有必要有极限，你会怎样想？让我再给你一个比方。当咱们与巴基斯坦人攀谈时，他们常会说中巴友谊比喜马拉雅山还高，比阿拉伯海还深，比蜜糖还甜。你会怎样做？你或许会浅笑，或许还会允许，由于你知道他们并没有歹意。

第二点是，我国并不是北约所称的“俄罗斯的抉择性支撑者”。我知道西方对我国出口许多或许具有军民两用的产品不满。但关于两用产品，咱们首要有必要假定这些产品先是民用的，而非军用的。就像汽油和天然气，没人会把它们视为军用产品。可是，假如将汽油加注到军用货车上，它们就或许转变为军用产品。因而当某物被以为是军民两用时，咱们应该首要假定它是民用的。

我国的确加大了对俄罗斯的出口，部分原因是遭到制裁的俄罗斯期望从其他区域添加进口，部分原因是我国的经济增速不如早年，我国当然期望添加出口。但这些出口并没有违背任何国际公约。

关于俄罗斯运用核兵器的问题，我以为我国不管是一般民众仍是领导层的情绪都很清晰。我曾在英国《金融时报》上宣告过一篇文章，最终写道：总统先生，不要运用核兵器！我知道中俄之间联系友爱，但我也清楚，我国几十年以来一向坚持不懈的方针是“不首要运用核兵器，不对无核国家和区域运用核兵器”。

当地时间2024年3月18日，联合国安理会就核裁军和防分散问题举办揭露会。中方代表标明，我国不参加任何方法的核军备竞赛，并呼吁国际社会合力推动核裁军与核不分散进程。

2022年11月，习近平主席对访华的德国总理朔尔茨标明，在欧洲不能运用核兵器。朔尔茨的访华遭到了某些人的批判，但他回国后标明，单是为了达到这个（不运用核兵器）一致，他的访华也是值得的。

接下来，我想说一下2022年联合国五个常任理事国在俄乌抵触之前发布的联合声明。这是一个源于暗斗时期的老标语：核战役打不赢，也打不得。但最有含义的是，当习近平主席2023年3月拜访俄罗斯时，在战役期间，中俄再次宣告了包含这一句话的联合声明。

我以为，我国一向在极力劝说俄罗斯不要运用核兵器。不然怎样会有这样的联合声明呢？因而，这意味着我国的确在极力为欧洲的平和与安稳做出活跃奉献。咱们不知道俄罗斯是否会运用核兵器。但我以为，我国、印度和巴西的情绪对俄罗斯而言是有重量的，我也期望这些国家的观念能发挥效果。

所以我以为，现在普京总统或许是俄罗斯领导层中最沉着的人，由于他在被俄罗斯学者卡拉加诺夫问及俄罗斯是否应该运用核兵器时，否认了这种或许性。

接下来，我想谈谈我国的核现代化。据报导，我国现在具有500枚核弹头，而依据五角大楼的说法，我国计划在2035年之前将这一数量添加到1500枚。在我国，没有人会承认这个数字，由于它被视为秘要。

不过，即便这个数字是真的，我国的核武库依然远远小于美国和俄罗斯，两国的核弹头数量均超越5000枚。对我国而言，添加核兵器数量不管是从技能上仍是经济上都简略，由于我国把握了相关技能，而且是全球最强壮的工业国。我国的经济规划也至少是俄罗斯的十倍。

那么，是什么阻挠我国具有更多核弹头呢？我以为，主要原因在于我国不想卷进核军备竞赛，而这也在我国的国防预算中得到了很好的表现。为什么这么说呢？由于在国际联系中，有两样东西是不会哄人的。首要，地舆不会扯谎。你的举动会遭到地舆环境的极大束缚，比方在朝鲜半岛。

人们常常议论朝鲜或许主张核进犯，但咱们也要考虑到，朝鲜半岛的整个长度仅为1200公里。已然任何核辐射显然会留传在朝鲜半岛，那么究竟在什么状况下，朝鲜领导层会发起自杀性的核进犯呢？其次，国防预算也不会扯谎。不管你是否添加国防预算，这都会充沛反映出一个国家对地缘环境、自我才干、对手或敌人才干的评价。

我国的国防预算在曩昔四十年里一向坚持在2%以下。实践上，大多数时分，我国国防预算乃至只要GDP的1.5%左右或更低。这充沛反映出我国的自决心，标明我国对自身、区域乃至中美联系的决心。我国的决心至关重要，由于假如我国缺少这种决心，或许像印度和日本那样急剧添加国防预算，那么整个亚太区域将会堕入紊乱。

接下来，我想解释一下我国“把自身核力气维持在国家安全需求的最低水平”的含义。这在几份我国的国防白皮书中都有说到。最低水平究竟是多低呢？我个人的了解，要确保的是，即便我国宣告了不首要运用核兵器，其他核兵器国家也不敢对我国发起先下手为强核打击。这就要求我国具有满足的威慑力气。

众所周知，最近我国向南太平洋发射了洲际弹道导弹。这意味着什么？虽然我国媒体没有泄漏太多细节，但我信任这增强了我国公民对其戎行的决心，也展示了我国的军事才干。此外，这标明我国有必要对其装备力气进行现代化建设。我以为现代化不只仅意味着提高新的才干，还包含合理添加兵器数量。不然，假如数量没有改动，那实践上仅仅在进行保护。

我国的发射活动已提早告诉美国，而美国对此标明了必定。这让我不由考虑：将来美国是否也会告诉我国其核活动或洲际弹道导弹发射状况？究竟，中美两国现已签署了关于严峻军事活动的互通协议。那么，什么算是严峻军事活动？当然，我国的洲际弹道导弹发射是其间之一。那么，美国会不会提早告诉我国其在南海的举动？或许说，是否会告诉我国有关舰船将经过台湾海峡的状况？

接下来，我想议论台湾海峡产生核战役的或许性。我国政府依然在着重平和统一。乃至美国国防部长奥斯汀在香格里拉对话会上也标明，战役既不是火烧眉毛，也不是不行避免的，我对此感到高兴，由于这直接否认了美国一些将军关于我国将在2025年或2027年攻台的说法。究竟，奥斯汀的言辞应该是根据威望的信息和情报做出的。

咱们不或许对台湾公民运用核兵器，这简直是不行幻想的。可是，有一些美国人，比方前国防部部长帮办柯伯吉，以及一些智库，如大西洋理事会，宣扬美国在台湾海峡首要运用核兵器的问题，原因在于他们以为美国在惯例战役中正逐步处于下风。我对此的观念是，咱们有必要让美国抛弃这个荒唐的主意。

为此，我以为咱们应该添加一些核兵器，这样，在一场美国不敢对我国首要运用核兵器的惯例战役中，咱们能获得胜利。

接下来，有两个关于我国核方针的常见误解。榜首个是，我国不乐意议论核裁军。你或许听说过许多相关说法。但我以为，这实践上取决于你想与我国议论什么。为何不议论我国提出的“不首要运用核兵器”的方针？我国会十分乐意议论这个问题。

当地时间2024年9月15日，俄罗斯符拉迪沃斯托克，俄罗斯水兵“潘捷列耶夫水兵上将”号驱逐舰(右)参加了在日本海举办的俄罗斯太平洋舰队和我国公民解放军水兵军舰参加的“大洋-2024”战略指挥和顾问水兵演习。视觉我国

可是，假如你想借此窥探我国核现代化或展开的速度和规划，或许会感到绝望。由于中美假如要议论核裁军，两国需求大致旗鼓相当，因而要么我国需求大幅添加核兵器库存，要么美国需求大幅削减其核库存，这两者都不太或许。第二个误解则是美国最近提出的、最荒唐的《核布置攻略》。报导称，美军或许需求为俄罗斯、我国和朝鲜的“协作核对立”做好预备。

我的问题是，我国、俄罗斯和朝鲜何时协调过运用核兵器？我简直无法想起我国和朝鲜戎行何时有过联合演习，遑论或许触及核兵器方面的协作？这种主意太张狂了。根据这种荒唐的剖析来拟定战略简直是毫无理性而言。

接下来，我想谈谈我对中美战略安稳的观念。暗斗期间的战略安稳主要是指核兵器之间的均衡，但我以为在中美之间，咱们能够完成一种更广泛的战略安稳，这不只包含核弹头的数量，还能够包含新式范畴，例如网络、人工智能和太空。

我信任中美能够在这三个范畴进行对话，由于两边在这些范畴的距离并不大。我在《交际业务》上宣告的文章中说到，在网络安全范畴，咱们应该交流一份灵敏方针清单，确保在任何状况下都不进犯这些方针。在人工智能范畴，咱们应确保肯定的人类操控，特别是在核指挥和操控系统上。在外太空，咱们应议论制止在太空布置兵器的或许性，正如我国和俄罗斯所提议的那样。一起，咱们也能够议论西方提出的规矩和负责任行为的问题。

接下来，我想最终论述为什么我以为我国提出的“不首要运用核兵器”方针是全部核兵器国家都能够承受的。这是我最近在《交际方针》杂志上宣告过的观念。首要，在议论核裁军时，有两个前提条件。榜首，近期内制止核兵器是不或许的。我知道在2017年，非核兵器国家提出了制止核兵器的公约，但没有任何核兵器国家会期望现在就制止核兵器。

因而，这一点是不行行的。再者，在竞赛日益剧烈的状况下，核兵器国家也不或许期望削减自己核兵器的储藏。正如我方才说到的，我国也或许需求合理地添加核弹头数量。可是，我信任在这两个前提下，“不首要运用”看起来是下降核要挟的最实践的办法。

逻辑十分简略：即便你许诺不首要运用，它也不会削弱你的回击才干，一起你将站上品德高地。另一个原因是，经过一些研讨，我发现美国、英国和法国的核方针，实践上与我国的“不首要运用”方针并没有太大的距离。接下来让我逐一论述这些国家的状况。

例如，美国最近的核方针有所改动，但直到2022年，美国核态势评价标明只会考虑在极点状况下运用核兵器，以保卫美国及其盟友和同伴的严峻利益。

令我困惑的是一个要害字：“严峻利益”。我无法幻想，美国的什么利益或盟友的什么利益会要求美国首要运用核兵器。美国不是现已首要运用过核兵器吗？有哪些利益对美国如此重要，以至于美国需求首要运用核兵器，特别考虑到美国具有最强壮的惯例戎行和数量许多的核弹头？我知道美国的盟友对此感到忧虑，他们期望美国供给核保护伞。但让我回到之前说到的比方，咱们来谈谈朝鲜。

朝鲜时不时会宣告要挟，但他们真的发起核进犯的或许性有多大呢？任何一方在朝鲜半岛运用核兵器都是自杀行为，由于会留下放射性尘土。因而，正确的问题是，在什么状况下，朝鲜会抉择自杀？答案是，除非他们信任自己再也无法生计，期望与敌人玉石俱焚。若考虑朝鲜领导层的这一动机，咱们就不用忧虑他们会首要运用核兵器来进犯他国。

英国的核方针与美国十分相似，由于英国也只会在自卫的极点状况下考虑运用核兵器。法国则许诺遵从“够用即可”准则。综上所述，我得出的结论是，这些国家的核方针实践上与我国的核方针并没有太大不同。

最大的应战是怎样让俄罗斯参加其间。实践上，我以为俄罗斯的“先晋级后降级”战略在乌克兰抵触中是有用的，由于到现在为止，美国依然对乌克兰运用其供给的兵器设定了一些束缚。

那么，俄罗斯怎样才干抛弃当时做法，许诺不首要运用核兵器呢？由于这种战略存在一种窘境，由于“先晋级后降级”的战略取决于别人对要挟的感触与忧虑。要害在于，假如人们感遭到要挟，他们或许会感到恐惧。可是，假如你真的运用核兵器，你就无法操控对手的报复规划，这种以眼还眼的风险或许演变为无人期望产生的全面核战役。对俄罗斯来说，这或许会导致北约的介入，这是莫斯科最忧虑的工作。

因而我个人主张一种双轨制。首要，在欧洲方面，我主张北约选用两个过程。榜首步，北约能够对俄罗斯单方面作出不首要运用核兵器的许诺，做出一种好心的姿势。北约真的想要对俄罗斯首要运用核兵器吗？肯定不敢。所以，他们能够做出这样的许诺。经过这一好心的姿势，能够缓解紧张形势。

第二步或许对北约来说有点难以承受，但仍是能够施行的。北约能够许诺中止进一步扩张，以交换俄罗斯选用不首要运用核兵器的方针。北约或许会问：假如其他国家期望参加，咱们为什么要回绝扩张？我的观念是，俄罗斯的行为至少有北约扩张的要素，虽然这并不是悉数原因，但的确是原因之一，由于俄罗斯领导人对此重复提及。

从另一个实践的视点来看，现在只要三个国家在等候参加北约：波黑、格鲁吉亚和乌克兰。这三国与俄罗斯的联系都较为杂乱。由于期望参加北约，格鲁吉亚现现已历过一场战役，而乌克兰正处于战役中。因而，即便这三个国家参加北约，带来的费事也多于优点。而且实践上没有太多国家在等候参加北约。因而，我以为这在北约的可承受范围内。

至于亚洲，由于我国和俄罗斯联系友爱，两国已就不首要运用核兵器达到一致。假如我国和美国也能达到相似协议，将有助于削减与包含美国盟友在内的潜在抵触。

因而要害在于，我国和美国是否能够达到相似的协议。有人或许会觉得我过于单纯，竟然信任美国会赞同这样的姿势。但我并不以为这是想入非非，咱们能够从前史中得到启示。1998年，印度和巴基斯坦进行了核试验。没过多久，我国和美国敏捷达到了一项稀有的协议，展示了两个核大国之间的联合，即中止将互相的核兵器瞄准对方。两年后，联合国五个常任理事国于2000年都达到了核兵器互不瞄准协议。

这一协议的重要性在于，它传递了核兵器国家对国际核裁军的好心信号。虽然含义有限，但至少它是有象征含义的。可是，“互不瞄准”的问题是无法进行核对。你怎样能知道我是否在瞄准俄罗斯或美国呢？但我信任，不首要运用核兵器天然是该协议的下一过程。想想看，假如核兵器互不瞄准了，下一步是什么？当然是不首要运用。我不以为不首要运用核兵器仅仅口头许诺。有些人或许会说，我国倡议不首要运用核兵器仅仅一种交际手段。

那么，我想夸大点说，为什么咱们不都选用这个“交际手段”呢？这将构成一种品德束缚。互不瞄准无法核对，可是要是你首要运用了核兵器，人人都看得到！不首要运用核兵器的许诺对全国际有利。最终，已然全部五常国家都赞同“核战役打不赢”，那么咱们为什么不能许诺不首要运用核兵器呢？我就说到这儿。假如有任何问题我会极力答复。谢谢。

问答环节

听众一：我激烈赞同“不首要运用核兵器”的确是逻辑上的下一步。但我置疑美国是否乐意参加这一逐步推动的进程。

在欧洲，群众言辞在乌克兰问题上好像更倾向于支撑经过商洽完毕战役，而政治领导人却朝着相反方向举动。

让我举一个比方。最近欧洲议会经过了一项抉择，我引证一下，它呼吁“以全部或许的办法支撑乌克兰获得胜利”。在我看来，这是以一种可怕的办法去呼吁持续战役。

您以为美国利益是否驱动其持续乌克兰战役？我以为美国的情绪有两个原因。一是为了阻挠我国、欧洲和俄罗斯之间构成集团，由于从长远来看，这个集团或许比美国强壮得多。

一起，出于相同的目的，美国还企图损坏德国与俄罗斯之间的联系，并挑起俄罗斯与我国之间的不良联系。

周波：谢谢，我知道既有人赞同，也有人对立你的观念。

例如，《纽约时报》的专栏作家保罗・克鲁格曼以为，支撑乌克兰不会花费太多，但也有其别人持相反的观念。我以为现在美国很难找到处理方案，由于它实践上卷进了两场战役。美国以为我国是“步步紧逼的要挟”，所以他们想要点聚集我国。这两场仗无疑会涣散他们的注意力。

所以我不以为他们期望战役持续下去，但正如我之前所说，没有人知道怎样完毕这场战役。

帕格沃什驻日内瓦主任巴萨诺夫：这是一场极端风趣的争辩。我长时间支撑“不首要运用核兵器”的准则，我了解在完成这个主意的路途上存在许多困难。就在奥巴马脱离白宫前的最终几个月，他曾企图以此改动美国的方针。人们普遍以为他失利了，由于美国的盟国对立这一主意。

现在，我的剖析是美国军方组织美国一些最密切的盟国对立奥巴马的上述极力。

我以为咱们需求考虑各种要素，包含新的要素，以便在不首要运用核兵器方面获得发展，处理更多问题，奠定坚实或更牢靠的根底，包含你说到的中美之间战略安稳的重要要素，即人工智能、太空等范畴。

我激烈以为，新的范畴、新的才干或非核兵器、非核力气正在成为一个越来越需求处理的重要要素。

有一点我需求纠正，俄罗斯关于在乌克兰运用核兵器的争辩是一种过错的描绘。基本上除了一些痴人，包含领导层的痴人以外，没有人提及在乌克兰运用核兵器。问题是怎样阻挠北约的直接介入。我以为咱们需求推动 “不首要运用核兵器” 的理念。咱们需求开端仔细议论这些主意怎样运作，经过二轨交际开端。令人遗憾的是，一轨交际存在很大的妨碍。我不是说不或许完成打破，但的确存在妨碍，而且有必要清晰利益、关心、方针、过程、妨碍等等。谢谢。

周波：谢谢你的长篇议论。由于你没有提出问题，所以我就不回应了。

主持人：十分感谢。来自蒂莫西・赖特的两个问题。“不首要运用核兵器”公约是否包含签署国在兵力态势方面的改动？例如，各国持续坚持接到正告就发射态势；核战役仍或许因这种误算或意外而产生。所以问题是，你是否以为有（不首要运用的）政治声明就满足了？其次，我国说它不会参加核军备竞赛，却在添加核兵器渠道和运载工具的数量。所以他以为全部痕迹都标明我国将持续扩展其才干，那么这与我国的情绪相符吗？

周波：好的，让我先答复第二个问题。首要，我以为我国添加核兵器数量（假如真的产生的话）起伏不会很大，因而这不应该被视为核军备竞赛。是的，具有更多核兵器，正如我所说，这也意味着我国需求使其核力气现代化，由于我国期望使其全部兵种现代化，而火箭军也是其间之一。

现在让我来答复榜首个问题。假如全部国家都许诺不首要运用核兵器，实践上，你将自己置于全国际公民的监督之下，人们会看你是否真的能恪守许诺。假如全部有核国家都说我不会首要运用，那么这将能鼓动无核国家。想想看，核兵器国家，特别是美国这样一个最强壮的国家，为什么需求首要运用核兵器?

假如一群微小赤贫的国家之间结盟以自保，我能够了解。但假如是国际上最强壮的国家之间结盟，那么我就无法了解。假如你是最强壮的国家，人们知道进犯你的结果，由于你有满足的报复才干。那么为什么你不能许诺不首要运用核兵器呢？这不会下降你的报复才干。这便是我的观念。

我也知道现在各国要选用不首要运用核兵器的方针实践上有多困难。但我信任，一旦政治条件成熟，就或许会有适宜的时分。2000年咱们赞同核兵器互不瞄准对方之前，美国也有人说，这怎样或许实践呢？咱们考虑的是对方的才干，而不是目的，由于目的一夜之间就能改动。可是，印巴核试验为核大国供给了一个时机，核大国有必要表现出联合，有必要标明对立核试验，由于这种对立的情绪契合《不分散核兵器公约》。

不分散核兵器公约Wikipedia

主持人：咱们还有一些问题。安德鲁的问题是，假如一个恐怖组织开宣告核兵器并要挟到任何一个国际大国，会产生什么？“不首要运用”方针在这种状况下会怎样发挥效果？大卫问道，为了完成“不首要运用” 方针，你以为我国能够或应该向美国在东亚的盟友供给哪些确保？

周波：关于恐怖分子的问题。榜首个问题是，他们有核兵器吗？或许他们会首要运用核兵器吗？假如他们首要运用核兵器，你进行报复是彻底合理的，对吧？可是真实的问题在于，你怎样用核兵器报复一群很简略隐藏在某个难以被探测到的当地的恐怖分子呢？

让咱们谈谈东亚与我国。在任何状况下，我国会对任何国家首要发起核进犯吗？我国声称对南海的很大一部分具有主权，但到现在为止，我国底子没有对东南亚的任何国家宣告过运用武力的要挟。我国乃至正在与东盟商洽南海行为准则。相同道理，为什么我国会想用核兵器进犯无核的日本呢？你很难举出一个比方来阐明我国有对东亚任何国家运用核兵器的目的。

我给出的仅有比方是关于朝鲜，我以为，即便朝鲜不时地用张狂言辞宣告要挟。但实践上，任何核兵器的发射，即便是小型战术核弹，都是自杀行为，由于朝鲜半岛太小了。虽然有这样的言辞，但除非他们想自杀，不然他们很难做出这个抉择。仅有的问题是他们为什么想自杀呢？答案是除非他们以为自己无法再生计下去，他们想与你玉石俱焚。

听众二：谢谢。您能议论一下你们和朝鲜之间的联系吗？

周波：各方就朝鲜领导人是否理性有许多争辩。可是假如你看看曩昔20年产生的工作，我以为能够说朝鲜走边际方针很成功，对吧？走边际方针需求很多的估计，这不是一件简略做到的工作，就像是在走钢丝。所以我以为朝鲜领导人是理性的。

听众三：谢谢。我忧虑的是，在触及台湾的抵触中，抵触压力是否会超越运用核兵器的边界，致使咱们依然或许面对核战，特别考虑到非战略核兵器。

周波：我国有具有核才干的中程导弹。这是现实。但我国依然许诺不首要向任何国家运用核兵器。

咱们把台湾公民称为同胞。咱们怎样会对咱们称为“台湾同胞”的公民运用核兵器呢？所以这是彻底不行幻想的。我不信任会有这样的情形，但风险的是我方才所说的。一些美国人，比方前国防部部长帮办以及一些智库揭露叫嚣要美国在台湾海峡运用核兵器。

现在，你能够很简略地在网上查找到这些信息。从前史上看，美国人曾议论过对我国运用核兵器。所以在这一点上我有必要进行比较：当西方议论俄罗斯时，他们惧怕俄罗斯会运用核兵器；但当他们议论我国时，好像他们并不惧怕我国较小规划的核武库。相反，他们议论对我国人首要运用核兵器。所以对我国人来说，简略的逻辑是咱们有必要添加咱们的核武库。对咱们来说，正如我之前说到的，这只需求一个政治抉择。所以我想说，我国作为国际上最强壮的工业国家，西方国家真的应该为我国到现在为止如此抑制而幸亏。

听众四：假如咱们的确赞同了一项全球不首要运用核兵器方针，或许乃至是中美之间的双方不首要运用核兵器方针，那会怎样样呢？在全部核国家都赞同一项不首要运用核兵器方针之后，你以为下一步应该选用什么办法来进一步推动呢？

其次，怎样对无核国家供给消沉安全确保？不首要运用核兵器在其间起到什么效果呢？

周波：虽然我提出了这个主张，以为地道止境有一线期望，可是期望之光很弱小，并不亮堂。是的，对咱们来说做到这一点很困难，虽然我信任这是正确的工作，而且对全部有核国家来说都是可行的。

之后，我以为咱们有必要议论行进的路途，由于全面核裁军是人类的方针。

让我再给你举个比方。我刚刚扼要说到了咱们在外太空的竞赛。我国和俄罗斯标明不在外太空布置任何兵器。我以为这很有含义。咱们在地球上不是现已有满足多的兵器了吗？为什么还要在轨迹上放置兵器呢？还有什么人类的愚笨行为比在太空放置兵器来进犯自己的星球、自己的家乡更严峻呢？

可是美国和西方国家以为不在轨迹上布置任何兵器是不或许的。但我依然信任不布置兵器是或许的，由于迄今西方国家也没有把他们布置在太空的东西描绘为兵器。

假如一般群众以为咱们在外太空没有任何兵器，那么气氛将会轻松得多。我国和俄罗斯的提议是根据《月球公约》的，这是从《月球公约》向前迈出的一步，该公约制止在月球上布置任何兵器。假如你们不在月球上布置任何兵器，那又为什么要在轨迹上的任何当地布置兵器呢？假如不是由于美国对肯定霸权的巴望，它又为何要这么做呢？

听众五：我觉得我国的邻居们忧虑的不只仅是我国的核兵器，更是我国巨大的经济实力、巨大的戎行，以及我以为的一种扩张主义情绪，比方想要操控南海。或许这阻挠了美国宣告不首要运用核兵器的方针，由于它们想保存阻挠或遏止我国的权力，比方说，避免我国扩张并占据美国盟友的疆域。你怎样看？

周波：首要，对包含我在内的任何一个我国人来说，我国经济的蓬勃展开的确是一件功德。我国的军事力气的确在不断增加，这是毫无疑问的。但假如你谈到南海问题，我国并没有阻止任安在南海的自在飞行船舶。每年有大约十万艘船在南海通行。你可曾听到过这些船舶中有任何一艘诉苦我国阻止了飞行自在吗？是的，我国与一些东盟国家存在疆域争端，但人们忘掉一件事。这些声索国之间自身也存在堆叠的声索。所以问题不只仅存在于我国和东盟国家之间，问题在于我国看起来比这些国家要大得多。大让人觉得敬畏，小让人觉得心爱。人们喜爱小的东西，包含小黄瓜、小西红柿。这是人类的天性，而不是理性。这是我能给出的仅有原因。

Zhou Bo：Thank you，Ambassador Peter Jenkins. This is indeed a great honor for me to talk to distinguished Pugwash members. I'm especially grateful that my master of St Edmund’s College Sir Brian Heap is also present，particularly because he actually is suffering from COVID.

Today，I'm going to talk on a few aspects that are nuclear and China-related. The first question is，are we already in another nuclear age? Let me quote what late Premier Zhou Enlai said when he was asked by a French journalist，“what do you think of the French revolution?” His answer was reportedly“ it is too early to tell”. Then，have we entered into a new cold war? Again，probably it is also too early to tell. But if we would have nuclear weapon states like United States to kick off nuclear tests，as suggested by a number of Americans，including former American national security adviser Robert O’brien，who encouraged Trump to conduct a nuclear test should he become reelected，I am very much sure it will be followed by others. Then we definitely can say the big bangs of nuclear test herald the dawn of another nuclear age.

Let me first talk about the possibility of a nuclear war in Europe and China’s position. According to CIA’s estimate，the chance of a nuclear war in Ukraine is at 50 %. We don't know exactly what might happen， but according to CSIS，there are over 200 cases of Russian leadership referring to use of nuclear weapon in the context of the war in Ukraine. The question is，how serious are Russians? What we are seeing is that a few days ago，President Putin has ordered change of nuclear doctrine. Basically，that means lowering the threshold. The nuclear weapons might be used in response to an attack on Russia and Belarus using conventional weapons，if the attack poses a crucial threat to sovereignty. This kind of description about crucial threat to sovereignty actually is ambiguous，because then comes the question- What is crucial threat?

I personally believe there are a few situations in which Russia might be more likely to use nuclear weapons. One is，if they might lose Crimea，which is not quite possible in the current circumstance.

And then if they lose the four Southeastern regions that are already declared to be Russian territory under Russia’s constitution. Of course，there is a huge debate as to whether they could have full control of the four regions or not.

I believe the right answer is，nobody knows how the endgame looks like. Once I had a conversation with a Ukrainian ambassador who said something that really impressed me. I asked how long will the war last? She said “our grandchildren will continue to fight”. I don't know whether that is true or not，but that is what she said. So this is the second possibility，but the last one probably looks most real. That is when a red line no longer looks like a red line. I believe that is the time when the situation is most dangerous. I'm referring to Ukraine fighting deeper and deeper into the Russian territory using the weapons provided by the West. If that is the red line in the beginning，it no longer looks like a red line.

Then let's look at what has happened about the NATO expansion. I have talked to many people in the West. They don't believe that NATO’s expansion is the very reason that Russia decided to have a conflict with Ukraine，but I believe it is. In fact，warnings from Russia do not start from President Putin. It came from the Soviet time. It came from Mikhail Gorbachev down to Boris Yeltsin to President Putin. And what makes Putin different? He's the man who said enough is enough. So how the endgame in Ukraine would look like? It's too early to tell，but I assume the biggest possibility is a kind of armistice，very much like that in the Korean peninsula. But this armistice would be more volatile because one party is one of the P-5 countries with the largest nuclear stockpile in the world.

I assume I know what Russia is going to do -- play with kind of a nuclear ambiguity，or make very serious nuclear threats in decades to come. Why is that? The reason is very simple. Because Russia's conventional force has declined tremendously compared to the cold war era. Unlike in 1982 when they actually announced no first-use on nuclear weapons，in 1993，they dropped this pledge because after the dissolution of Soviet Union，Russia is no longer as strong as before in conventional forces.

Then，what about China? First of all，I need to say something about China's friendship with Russia，which，described as “unlimited partnership”， alarms the whole West.

But for me，this kind of unlimited partnership is just a natural description of China’s good wish to develop friendship with its largest neighbor. Just think of this: If I say I want to develop my friendship with you，but then I say，hang on for a moment，this friendship has to be limited. What do you think? Let me give you another example. When we talk to Pakistanis，Pakistanis would often say China-Pakistan friendship is higher than the Himalayan mountain，deeper than the Arabian sea，and sweeter than honey. What would you do? You would smile，and probably nod your head，because you know that they mean no harm.

The second thing is，China is not a “decisive enabler of Russia” as NATO described. I know the West is not happy with China exporting a lot of items that might be dual use in nature. But when something is dual use in nature，first，we have to assume it is a civilian item rather than a military product. Just like oil and gas. Nobody considers oil and gas military products. But if it is put into the tank of a military truck，it could immediately become a military product. Therefore，when something is dual-use in nature，we have to assume it is for civilian use first.

China has indeed exported more things to Russia，partly because Russia being sanctioned needs more import from elsewhere，and partly because China of course wants to export more because Chinese economic growth has slowed down. But none of these exports is violating any international treaties. On Russia using nuclear weapons，I think in China，all people from ordinary Chinese people to Chinese leadership，the attitude is quite clear. I myself has written an opinion that was published in Financial Times ending with a sentence: don't use nuclear weapons，Mr. President. I know the good relationship between China and Russia，but I also know it is a decades-old firm Chinese policy of not using nuclear weapons first，and not use nuclear weapons against nuclear weapon free countries and zones.

In November 2022，President Xi told visiting German chancellor Olaf Scholz no use of nuclear weapons in Europe. Olaf Scholz’s visit to China was criticized by some people. He went back and said even for this consensus，his visit to China was worthwhile.

Then I need to say something about P-5 joint statement in 2022 before Russia's war in Ukraine. This is an old slogan coming from the cold war -- nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. But what is most interesting is that when President Xi Jinping visited Russia in March，2023 amid the war， again we had a joint statement between China and Russia in which this slogan was repeated. I think China has been trying its best in telling Russia not to use nuclear weapons. Otherwise，how could we have this joint statement? That means China is really trying hard to make its due contribution towards peace and stability in Europe. We don't know whether Russia will use nukes or not. But I think the attitude of China，India，and Brazil matters for Russia. And I hope it matters.

So I believe right now，President Putin probably is the most rational person in the Russian leadership，because he denied the possibility of using nuclear weapons when he was asked by Karaganov whether Russia should use it or not，he said no.

Now let me talk about China’s nuclear modernization. Reportedly，China has 500 nuclear warheads. And it has an ambition to increase this nuclear arsenal to 1,500 by 2035 according to the Pentagon. No one in China will confirm this number because this is considered a secret in China. But even if this is true， China’s nuclear arsenal is apparently still much smaller than that of the United States and Russia. Both of them have more than 5,000 nuclear warheads. For China to increase its nuclear arsenal，technically and economically，it is simple. China has technical know-how and China is the strongest industrial nation on earth. China’s economy is at least 10 times larger than Russia.

So what is impeding China from having more nuclear warheads? I believe that is because China believes it should not enter into a nuclear arms race. China’s defense budget tells more than anything about this. Why? Because I believe in international relations，there are two things that won't lie. Geography would not lie，because your operations would be very much constrained by geography，such as in Korean peninsula. People have been talking about how DPRK might launch a nuclear attack，but think of Korean peninsula，which is just 1200 kilometers in length. Given the nuclear radioactive dust that will surely linger on the peninsular，the question is in what kind of situation would the North Korean leader decide to launch a nuclear attack that is surely suicidal? Then，defense budget would not lie，because defense budget，whether you increase it or not，will tell your real assessment about the environment，about your self-confidence and about your adversaries or enemies.

China’s defense budget has been under 2 % for four decades. Basically，most of the time，it's around or even lower than 1.5 % of its GDP. This tells a lot about China. It tells China is confident about itself. It tells China is confident about the region. And it even tells China is confident about the China-U.S. relationship. China's confidence certainly matters，because if China is not confident，if it drastically increases defense budget like India and Japan，then the whole Asia-Pacific would be chaotic.

Then，let me try to explain what does “keeping the nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security” mean. This is quoted in several Chinese defense white paper. What is the minimum level? My personal understanding is，no nuclear weapon states dare to launch a preemptive nuclear strike on China in spite of China’s no-first use of nuclear weapons. This in turn requires China to have adequate strength of deterrence.

Everybody knows that recently，China launched ICBM into the Southern Pacific. What does this mean? The Chinese press release didn't tell much，but I believe it is a boost of Chinese people's confidence in its own military. It is also a demonstration of China’s military capability. It also demonstrates that China would have to modernize its armed forces. I think modernization means new capabilities and reasonably increased quantity. If you just keep the same number，then you are just doing a maintenance job. China’s launch has been notified to the United States. The United States has expressed appreciation for this. This invited a question: would the United States also notify China about its nuclear activities or about its ICBM launches one day? Especially because China and the United States have actually signed agreement on mutual notification of major military activities. Then what are major military activities? Of course，China's launch of ICBM is one of them. What about the United States? Would you notify China what you are going to do in the South China sea? Or when your ships are going to sail through Taiwan Strait?

Perhaps it will be surprising for you to know that I am going to talk about the possibility of a nuclear war in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese government still talks about peaceful unification. Even the American secretary of defense Lloyd Austin said at Shangri-La Dialogue a war is not imminent or inevitable. I'm happy he talked about this，because this is a direct denial of quite a few allegations from some American generals and admirals that China is about to attack Taiwan in 2025 or 2027，so on and so forth，because Austin should have talked with authority based on briefings，information and intelligence.

We certainly would not use nuclear weapons against our own people in Taiwan. This can hardly be imagined for any Chinese. But the question is，there are some Americans like former deputy assistant secretary Elbridge Colby，or some think tanks like Atlantic Council talking about United States using nuclear weapons first in Taiwan Strait，because they believe the US military is becoming inferior to the PLA in terms of conventional warfare. My answer is that we have to let the United States give up this crazy idea. And for that to happen，I think we have to increase some nuclear weapons so we can prevail in a conventional war against the United States in which the United States dare not use nuclear weapons against China first.

There are two myths on China’s nuclear policy. One is that China doesn't want talks on nuclear disarmament. You should have heard a lot about this. But my argument is that it really depends on what you want to talk to China. How about talking about Chinese proposal -- no first-use of nuclear weapons? China is more than willing to talk about this. But if you want to talk to China to find out the speed and scale of China’s nuclear modernization or development，probably you would become disappointed. Because for China and the US to talk about nuclear disarmament，there has to be a parity--either China has to drastically increases its nuclear stockpile，or the United States has to drastically decrease its nuclear stockpile to reach an equilibrium. None of them looks possible. The second myth is something most recent and most ridiculous，the so-called “nuclear employment guidance” of the United States. It is reported that the U.S. has to prepare for coordinated nuclear confrontation with China，Russia and North Korea simultaneously.

My question is，when have China，Russia and North Korea coordinated their nuclear weapons? I can hardly remember when China had a joint exercise with the North Korean military. How come we have coordinated our nuclear weapons? This is totally insane. People making a strategy based upon such insane analysis is crazy.

Then let me talk about what I believe is China-U.S. strategic stability. Strategic stability during the cold war refers to the equilibrium in nuclear weapons，but I believe between China and the U.S.，we can actually have a kind of strategic stability，not only on the number of warheads，but also including some new areas，that is cyber，AI and outer space.

I believe China and the US can afford to talk to each other in these three areas just because the gaps between the two sides are not so big in these areas. As I have proposed in my article in “Foreign Affairs”，in cyber，we should exchange a list of sensitive targets between China and U.S. that should not be attacked in any circumstances; In AI，we should make sure absolute human control over the command & control，especially the nuclear command & control system; and in outer space，we should discuss no-placement of weapons in outer space，as China and Russia have proposed. At the same time，we can also discuss what the West has proposed: to talk about rules and responsible behaviors.

Now let me come to the final part of what I am going to say-- Why I consider no-first use of nuclear weapons China proposed is affordable for all nuclear weapons states. This is what I have written recently in “Foreign Policy” magazine. Because I believe，first of all，there are two preconditions for us to talk about nuclear disarmament. First，it is impossible to ban nuclear weapons anytime soon. I know there is a treaty about prohibition of nuclear weapons in 2017 by non-nuclear weapons states. But none of the nuclear weapon states would wish to ban nuclear weapons now.

So it is impossible. Again，what is equally impossible is that the nuclear weapon states would wish to reduce their nuclear stockpiles amid ever intensifying competition. As I’ve just said， probably China would also have to reasonably increase its nuclear stockpile. But I believe with these two as preconditions，no first-use looks like the most realistic approach in reducing nuclear threats. Why is that? Simply put，it would not reduce your capabilities for retaliation，even if you promise no-first use. At the same time，you would enjoy moral high ground. Another reason is，I believe，after some studies，that American，British，and French nuclear policies actually are not so far away from China’s no first use. Let me come to each one of these countries.

For example，American’s recent nuclear policy has changed a bit，but until 2022，for example，in its nuclear posture review，it said that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in the extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States and its allies and partners. What confused me is the key word，“vital interests”. I just cannot imagine what kind of vital interests or interests of allies would require United States to use nuclear weapons first. Didn't the United States already use nuclear weapons first? What kind of interests are so important for United States that，having the strongest conventional forces and also one of the largest numbers of nuclear warheads，the US still would have to use nuclear weapons first? I know American allies are concerned. They want the United States to provide nuclear umbrella. But let me come back to the example，which I mentioned before.

Let's talk about the DPRK. DPRK would make threats from time to time.

But how likely would it be for them to really launch a nuclear attack? Because any use of nuclear weapons would be suicidal given the radioactive dust that would be lingering over Korean peninsula. So the right question is，in what kind of circumstances would DPRK decide to commit suicide? The answer is unless they believe they can no longer live，so they want to die with you. If we believe in the rationality of the DPRK leadership，then we do not need to worry about their first use of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear policy of UK is very much similar to that of the United States，because UK also talks about using nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defense. And when we come to France，France has pledged to hold to a principle of strict sufficiency. This is why I have concluded that the nuclear policies of these countries actually are not that far away from China’s.

The biggest challenge is how to get Russia in. Actually，I would say Russia’s strategy to “escalate to deescalate” has worked in the war in Ukraine，because so far，the United States has still put some limits on what Ukraine can do with weapons that it has supplied. So how can Russia give it up to pledge no-first use? Because there is a dilemma of this strategy，because this strategy to “escalate to deescalate” depends on threats and fear of threats by other people. The point is，if people are threatened，they might become afraid. But if you really use nukes， you cannot control the scale of the retaliation by your adversaries，a tit-for-tat risks of becoming a full blown nuclear war that nobody wants. For Russia，it might just invite the involvement of NATO，the very thing that Moscow fears most if Russia really uses nuclear weapons.

This is why I suggest a kind of a dual track approach，my personal suggestion. In Europe，I suggest two steps for NATO. The first step is that NATO makes a unilateral no-first use pledge against Russia as a gesture of goodwill. Does NATO want to use nuclear weapons first against Russia? Never. So you can afford to make a unilateral no first use pledge. Because with this gesture，tensions can start to thaw.

Then the second step is a little bit bitter for NATO to swallow，but still affordable. That is NATO pledges to halt any further expansion of the alliance in exchange for Moscow to adopt no first use policy. NATO would say，why should I stop expansion when other countries want to join? My argument is that at least NATO’s expansion so far has a role in Russia’s response if it is not the whole reason because Russian leaders keep talking about it.

From another realistic point of view，right now there are only three countries on the waiting list to join NATO. That is Bosnia and Herzegovina，Georgia，and Ukraine. All these three countries have some troubled relationship with Russia，because they want to join NATO. Georgia and Ukraine，one had a war with Russia，another one is having a war with Russia. So these three countries’ entry into NATO would bring more trouble than benefit. Since there aren't other countries waiting to join，I believe it is affordable for NATO.

And then in Asia，China and Russia have already agreed to no first use against each other，apparently，because of the good relationship. But if China and the United States could reach a similar agreement，then it would deescalate a lot of potential conflicts involving American allies.

So the crucial point is whether China and the United States could reach a similar agreement. People might consider I am too naïve to believe that the United States would do that. But I don’t think I’m naive if I give you a lesson from history. India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Very soon，China and the United States came to something which was so rare，that is， they quickly agreed to show solidarity between two nuclear powers，that is，to de-target their nuclear weapons at each other. In two years’ time，all the P5 countries have agreed on non-targeting in 2000.

The strong point of this agreement is that it is a good sign of the goodwill of the nuclear weapons states towards world nuclear disarmament. Even if non-targeting is not that significant，at least it's symbolic. The problem of non-targeting is it is not verifiable. How do you know if I’m targeting Russia or the United States or not? But I believe no first use is the natural step forward. Listen to this，non-targeting of nuclear weapons，what is the next step? Of course no-first use of nuclear weapons. I don't think no first use of nuclear weapons is lip service. Some people say China’s promotion of no first use is a kind of diplomatic ploy.

But then let me exaggerate to say，how about all of us join this “diplomatic poly”? Because this would become morally binding. Non-targeting is not verifiable，but no-first use is verifiable if you use nukes! No first use is good for the whole world. Finally，since all P-5 countries have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won，why can't we pledge no-first use? Let me stop here and try my best to answer some of your questions. Thank you.

Comments: I agree very strongly no first use is a sort of logical step forward. But I doubt the United States will be willing to go along with this step by step process for the following reason.

It's already becoming clear in Europe. In my opinion，a public opinion is moving in favor of supporting negotiations to end the war whilst European political leaders are moving in the opposite direction.

Just to give one example，if I may. It was the European parliament resolution recently，which was passed，which called for，and I'm gonna quote， “support in every way possible for Ukraine's victory”. That's a sort of horrible blood curdling cry for a continuation of war，in my opinion.

So do you think the United States has an interest in maintaining the war in Ukraine. And I think that would be for two reasons. One is to prevent a bloc between China，Europe and Russia， which would make it considerably stronger than the United States，that's in the longer term.

And also，for that same end to foster bad relations between Germany and Russia and to encourage bad relations between Russia and China.

Zhou Bo:Thank you. I do understand that there are two kinds of people in supporting or opposing your views.

For example，Paul Krugerman，columnist of The New York Times，has actually said that supporting Ukraine would not cost much，but there are other people arguing the other way around. I believe right now，the United States is really struggling to find a solution，because it is actually involved in two wars. It believes that China is a “ pacing threat”，so they want to be focused on China. These two wars would definitely distract its attention.

So I don't think they want the war to continue，but as I said before，nobody knows how to end this war.

Sergey Batsanov( director of Pugwash，Geneva): It's an extremely interesting debate which has just started. I am a long-time enthusiast of no first use objective. I understand that there are many difficulties on the way to this idea. Obama tried to change the US policy from this particular aspect，just in the several last months before his departure from the White House. The common story is that he failed because the US allies objected to that.

Now，my analysis was even before that happened，that it was US military who arranged rejection of this Obama’s idea by the closest or some of the closest allies.

I think that we need to take into account a variety of factors，including new factors in order to prepare a solid or a more reliable base for making progress for no first use，including what you mentioned，when you discussed elements，important elements of strategic stability or sharing strategic stability between China and the US -- artificial intelligence，space and so on.

I would very strongly note that the new functions，new capabilities，or non-nuclear models，non nuclear forces，are becoming stronger and stronger factors that need to be addressed.

Now，one thing I need to correct. The debate in Russia about using nuclear weapons in Ukraine is a wrong description. Nobody is talking about using nuclear weapons in Ukraine，basically， except for some idiots，also high-level idiots. The question is about how to deter direct NATO involvement. To sum everything up，I think we need to move forward with the no first use; the idea I want to move，we need to start discussing seriously those ideas --how they work，starting with Track-II process，because Track-I has important limitations. I'm not saying it's impossible，but you have the limitations. And there is a need to clarify interests，preoccupations，objectives，steps，obstacles，and so on so forth. Thank you.

Zhou Bo:Thank you for your long comment. Since there are no questions，I wish not to respond.

Comments: Thanks very much. I've got two questions from Timothy Wright. He asked will a proposed no first use treaty encompasses change to a signatory’s respective force posture. If countries continue to have a launch on warning posture，for instance，nuclear war can still happen through miscalculation or accident. So he's asking if you think that political statement is sufficient，and secondly，China says it won't enter a nuclear arms race but it is expanding the number of the platforms and delivery vehicles. So he's arguing that all the signs are that China will continue to expand its capacities，and how does this align with Beijing’s position?

Zhou Bo: Let me come to the second question first. I think China's increase of nuclear weapons，if it really happens，would not be on a huge margin，therefore it would not be considered a nuclear arms race. Having more nuclear weapons，this is what I said，also means that China needs to modernize its nuclear forces because China would like to modernize all its military services，Rocket Force is also one of them. Now let me come to the first question. If all countries promise no first use，actually，you put yourself in the hands of the people around the world. People will see if you really honor your promise or not. If all nuclear weapons states say I won’t be the first to use，then this is a consensus that would be encouraging for non-nuclear weapons states. Just think of this，why should we need to use nuclear weapons first，especially for the United States which is the strongest nation on earth?

If an alliance is among a group of small，poor countries for self-defence，I understand it. But if this kind of alliance is among the strongest nations on earth，then I do not understand. If you are the strongest nation，people know the consequence if they attack you，you certainly have more than enough capabilities in retaliation. So why can't you promise no-first-use because it would not reduce your capabilities in retaliation. I know how difficult it is actually now for countries to adopt no first use. But I believe there could be a moment when political conditions are ripe. When we talk about non-targeting of nuclear weapons before 2000，there was also a voice in the United States which said，how can this be realistic? What I'm thinking about you is about your capability，not your gesture. But the Indo-Pakistan nuclear tests provide such a chance that the nuclear powers have to show a kind of solidarity. And nuclear powers have to show their opposition because their opposition is in line with NPT.

Comments: We have a few more questions. So one from Andrew，what would happen if a terrorist organization developed a nuclear weapon and threatened any of the world powers? How would no first use policy work then? David asks what assurances do you think China could or should give to US allies in East Asia about its intentions?

Zhou Bo：Well，about terrorists. First of all，do they have nuclear weapons? Or would they will use nuclear weapons first? Because if they use nuclear weapon first，if you retaliate，you are fully entitled to retaliate，right? So the genuine question actually is，how could you retaliate with nuclear weapons against a group of terrorists who could easily hide themselves somewhere? That is difficult to detect.

Let's talk about East Asia. Let's talk about China. Why in any circumstances would China launch a nuclear attack first on any countries? China claims large part of South China Sea，but so far， China has made no threats of using force at all toward any country in Southeast Asia. China is even negotiating a South China Sea code of conduct with ASEAN. Likewise，why would China want to use nuclear weapons against Japan which has no nuclear weapons? You can hardly give an example to say China has intention to use nuclear weapons against any country in East Asia.

The only example I gave just now is about DPRK which would make crazy remarks from time to time. But in reality，any launch of nuclear weapons，even small tactical nuclear bombs，is suicidal because the Korean Peninsula is too small. They，in spite of rhetoric，can hardly make this decision unless they want to commit suicide with someone. Then the question is why would they want to commit suicide? The answer is: unless they believe they could no longer live，so they want to die with you.

Comments: Thank you. Can you have a general comment on the relations between you and North Korea.

Zhou Bo：You see，there are so many debates about whether the North Korean leadership is rational or not. But if you look at what happened in the last 20 years，I think it is correct to say they have walked so fine on brinksmanship. Right? Brinksmanship requires a lot of the calculations，a lot of rationality-not something easily to be done，this is walking on a tight rope. So I would assume the leadership of DPRK is rational.

Comments: Thank you. I'm concerned，in a conflict over Taiwan，whether the conflict pressure would exceed this threshold，and we could still have nuclear war，and specifically in the context of non strategic nuclear weapons.

Zhou Bo：In China，there are some intermediate range missiles that are nuclear capable. That is true. But still，China has promised not to use nuclear weapons first against anyone.

We describe Taiwan people as our own compatriots. How can you imagine that we would use nuclear weapons against people whom we call “our compatriots in Taiwan”? It's totally unimaginable. I don't believe there is such a scenario，but what is dangerous is what I said just now. Some Americans including a former deputy assistant secretary of defense，and some think tanks openly ask the United States to use nuclear weapons in Taiwan Strait.

Now you can just google that very easily. Historically，they（ in the US）talked about using nuclear weapons against China. So I have to compare: when the West talked about Russia， they're just afraid Russia would use nuclear weapons. But when they talk about China，it seems that they are not afraid of China's smaller nuclear arsenal. Instead，they talk about using nukes first against the Chinese. So the simple logic for Chinese is that we have to increase our nuclear arsenal. And for us，as I mentioned before，it's just a political decision. Right? We are economically strong. We have technical know-how. We are the strongest industrial nation on earth. So I would say that the western countries should really congratulate themselves for China being so restraint until now.

Comments: let’s assume we did agree on a global no first use policy or even one bilaterally between the US and China. What do you see as the next step to build on that after a no first use policy has been agreed by all nuclear states?

Secondly，what about negative security assurances for non-nuclear weapons states? How does that play into this?

In spite of my proposal，I believe this is really the light at the end of the tunnel. It is dim light，it is not bright light. Yeah，it's difficult for us to do it，although I believe it is the right thing to do，and it is affordable for all nuclear weapon states.

Then I believe we have to discuss about the ways forward because in NPT，total nuclear disarmament is the goal of mankind.

Let me give you another example. I just briefly mentioned about our competition in outer space. China and Russia said no placement of any weapons in outer space. I think this makes a lot of sense. Don't we already have enough weapons on earth? Why should you place weapons in orbits? And which human folly is more monumental than places something in outer space to strike back on earth，our planet，our only homeland? But the United States and western countries just believe it is impossible not to place weapons in orbits.

They believe we can deploy them，but we need to discuss about responsible behaviors. But I still believe no placement of weapons in space is possible，because no West countries so far have described what they have deployed in space as a weapon.

So it would be much more relaxed if ordinary people think we do not have any weapons in outer space，because China and Russia's proposal comes from the Moon Treaty，but it is a step forward from Moon Treaty，which prohibits any placement of weapons in moon. If you don't place any weapons in moon，why would you place any weapon anywhere in orbit? If it is not for America’s desire for absolute supremacy，what is impeding Americans from doing so?

Comments: It strikes me that what worries China's neighbors is not so much its nuclear weapons，but its huge economic power. It's massive army，and it's what I would say is a kind of expansionist attitude in wanting to take over the South China Sea. It prevents the US from declaring no first use policy. Because it wants to preserve the right to prevent or deter China， say，from taking over the US allies. How do you feel about that?

Zhou Bo:First，I think it’s really a good thing for Chinese economy to become booming，for any Chinese like me. China's military is really growing. That is no doubt. But if you talk about the South China Sea，China is not impeding with any ships’ freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. There are 100,000 ships transiting through the South China Sea every year. Have you ever heard any complaint from the ships that China is impeding freedom of navigation? Yes，China has some territorial disputes with some ASEAN countries，but people forget one thing. These claimants have overlapping claims themselves. So it's not only between China and ASEAN countries. The problem is that China looks much bigger than these countries. Big is beautiful and small is adorable. People love things small，including baby cucumber，baby tomato. That is human instinct，not rationality. That is the only reason I can give.

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